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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we examine the under-researched 
Greek banking market; inadequate transparency 
and disclosure about exposures has led to 
counterparty concerns and renewed strains in bank 
funding markets. Greek banks, now struggling 
with the need to increase provisions against bad 
debts, asset write-offs and with problems of 
liquidity as a result of being frozen out of the 
interbank lending market are completely reliant on 
the European Central Bank. The study examines 
the impact that Basel II had on the risk disclosure 
practices in the Greek banking sector. The 
disclosure practices and their potential relationship 
with size, risk profile and profitability of the most 
actively traded Greek banks are examined. In 
2010, the latest wave of outcry from investors 
surfaced, demanding the disclosure of information 
showing how Greece and Greek banks used 
derivatives to hide their deficits when Greek banks 
entered into a large number of private, off- market 
swaps from 2001 through 2007. There is a 
compelling public interest in relevant information 
being disclosed.  
 
The results show that inadequacies still exist 
despite the fact that Basel II managed to raise the 
risk disclosing amounts in the annual reports of the 
Greek banks. The informational content of the 
disclosures is suspect, due to that little quantitative 
information is disclosed; favouritism towards 
qualitative and past related disclosures is revealed. 
 
 
Furthermore, no quasi-norms between the size, 
profitability or risk profile of the institutions and 
their risk disclosing quantities is revealed.  
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Disclosing policies and the quantity of disclosures 
have evolved, throughout the examined period in 
the Greek banking industry; yet, transparency 
issues and quality problems are still present owing 
to the high degree of secrecy of the internal Greek 
market. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation to the Study 
 
The decline of conventional banking and the 
simultaneous rise of shadow banking have created 
many challenges for regulators and supervisors to 
react to the new reality by implementing new 
policies and strategies able to respond to the new 
status-quo. This need grew even greater especially 
after the East Asian crisis (1997), with investors 
favorably disposed to more capable regulation for 
controlling risk taking and information disclosure. 
The 2007 crisis came to further highlight the 
inadequacies of existing regulations. It emphasized 
the need to control systemic risk and to develop 
and modernize risk management through stressing 
the need to raise the quality and quantity of risk 
disclosures addressed in the Basel II accord. The 
existing regulatory framework has not been 
sufficient. Greater transparency through enhanced 
risk disclosure guides well informed decisions and 
reduces mistrust and moral hazard among the 
market participants. Markets could potentially be 
less harsh in high-disclosure regimes than 
otherwise, hence a far-reaching disclosure of bank 
problems can quickly lead to recuperation from a 
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crisis, thus assisting in moderating projected 
(realized) losses (Rosengren, 1999). However, 
there is limited research and conflicting views 
regarding how risk reporting and risk disclosure 
practices can evolve. Most of the research to date 
concentrates on fully developed financial markets 
and only on aggregate measures which make it 
difficult to dissect reporting practices on a regional 
basis. There is little research on the field of risk 
disclosure of Greek banks which represent a 
sizeable proportion of funds for the Greek market. 
The country‟s low disclosure ranking (Cerf Index), 
the results of the most recent stress testing 
exercises of the Greek banking industry, the failure 
of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE) to 
comply with disclosure requirements and 
withstand the extremely adverse scenario 
prompted our interest in researching the Greek 
region. We evaluate the impact that Basel II had 
on the volume and quality of credit risk and 
interest rate risk disclosures in the Greek banking 
sector by examining the level of disclosures in the 
periods right before and after the implementation 
of Basel II and IFRS requirements
1
; we examine 
the extent to which risk disclosure practices have 
evolved by studying potential relationships 
between risk disclosure volumes and size, risk 
profile and profitability parameters. Five 
objectives have been established in order to meet 
the aims of our study:  
 
i) To test whether the application of Basel II 
increased the volume of banks risk disclosures in 
the Greek region.  
ii) To test whether a potential relationship 
exists between bank size and the volume of risk 
disclosures. 
iii) To test whether a potential relationship 
exists between the risk profile of banks and the 
volume of risk disclosures.  
iv) To test whether a potential relationship 
exists between bank profitability and the volume 
of risk disclosure. 
 
2. Disclosure 
 
A richer information set is not necessarily linked 
to positive „returns‟. Economic theory presents us 
with contradictory expectations regarding the 
advantages of greater banking stability through 
enhanced disclosures. More information is rather 
associated with both beneficial and destructive 
externalities. Hence, richer disclosure and 
transparency can, on the one hand, influence 
sensible bank risk-taking through market 
discipline (Barth et.al. 2004). Equally, on the 
                                                 
1 Introduction and transition to IFRS was required by the 
end of 2005, with permissions to delay introduction until 
2007 and be fully functional by 2008. 
other, richer disclosure has also the prospect of 
destabilizing effects by transmitting depressing 
informational spillovers throughout a banking 
system (Tadesse, 2006). The bulk of the evidence 
however, implies that heightened disclosures tend 
to support the stability of the banking system (Nier 
and Baumann, 2006). Goldstein (1998) and Shirai 
(2001)
 
argue that low quality disclosures, 
transparency and auditing standards contribute 
greatly in the occurrence of a crisis. More 
diaphanous regimes maintained by authoritarian 
establishments that direct the provision of 
generous information disclosures both 
quantitatively and qualitatively are inclined to be 
more dynamic to the instability that cyclically 
captures the banking system. Basel II offered the 
opportunity for improved risk management 
systems in banks, upgrading the supervisory 
approaches and fostering market discipline. The 
three „mutually reinforcing pillars‟ of the Accord 
aim to enable the supervisors and banks to make 
an assessment of the risks faced. All these were 
expected to greatly contribute to the soundness and 
safety of financial structures.  
Linsley et al. (2006) find out that most information 
regarding risk is qualitative rather quantitative 
(66.6% qualitative – 33.4% quantitative) with 
greater disclosure of future risk information rather 
than present or past; they conclude that there is a 
positive association between the levels of risk 
disclosure with the bank size and the number of 
risk definitions. On this matter more recent 
research (KPMG, 2009) shows that most European 
banks talk about consequences of the crisis on 
their risks and returns. Additionally, Linsley and 
Shrives (2005) also discovered a correlation 
among bank size and quantity of disclosures. They 
assert that this is due to the fact that large 
companies have higher number of stakeholders to 
whom the firm is accountable and as a result it has 
to present more information. On the other hand, 
Woods et al. (2009) in their paper discover that 
increasing levels of disclosure and the size of the 
bank do not correlate but the bigger the report the 
more disclosures it contains. Yet again, Beretta 
and Bozzolan (2004) in their research on listed 
non-financial firms discover that the quantity of 
disclosures is not a satisfactory proxy for the 
quality of disclosure. They argue, however, that 
size is both a strong driver and an enabler. 
Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) discover that there 
is indeed a negative relation between the level of 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital but this 
applies only to European banks. Linsley and 
Shrives (2005) also found out that better disclosure 
encourages better risk management; they cite fear 
of judgment relating to risk disclosures denoting to 
the future, that might not come true thus creating 
sometimes the opposite result (i.e. less disclosure). 
Abdelsalam and Weetman (2007) found that 
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disclosure levels are associated with audit firm 
type, business type, leverage, liquidity and legal 
form.  
And there have been other studies that show the 
presence of a significant relationship between 
industry type and disclosure level (Cooke, 1991, 
1992; Meek et al. 1995; Wallace and Naser 1995; 
Naser 1998; Camffernman and Cooke 2002; and 
Archambault and Archambault 2003). On the other 
hand, other research reports no relationship 
between industry types and levels of disclosure 
(Wallace et al. 1994; Inchausti 1997; Owusu-
Ansah 1998; Naser et al. 2002; Akhtaruddin 2005; 
and Al Saeed 2006). Several research questions 
emerge from the literature regarding risk 
disclosure. Some researchers (Linsley et al. 2006) 
ask for reproduction and extension of their project 
on other regions in different points in time in order 
to have an image of how techniques change 
throughout time and markets. Woods et al. (2009) 
argue that even though banks stand at a vanguard 
position regarding developments in risk 
management, the banking sector is still under-
researched when it comes to public risk disclosure. 
Jordan et al. (2000) observe that - especially for 
such types of banks that do not comprehensively 
account for their factual circumstances in 
preceding admissions - investors find qualified 
information valuable in valuing bank securities.  
Hence, there is some evidence that the efficacy of 
market-based restraints also depends on the 
efficacy of the regulatory environment; and the 
number of studies on risk disclosure after 2008 is 
even more limited. Bank reporting (both the 
elements of disclosure and transparency) should be 
regarded as endemic to the regulatory 
establishments underlying the banking system. 
Barth et al. (2004), for instance, investigate the 
association between bank regulation in general and 
banking system rigidity. Even less studies bestow 
the community with international comparisons of 
disclosure requirements as part of level-playing 
regulatory regimes or equally of the effects that 
variation has in required transparency on banking 
system stability. In the case of Greece, the low 
rank assigned to the degree of corporate disclosure 
and transparency has motivated research studies 
but disclosure and transparency is examined in a 
different research context. Research on financial 
disclosure has also been quantified in the literature 
mainly through the Cerf index which covers 
measurement, recognition and disclosure of 
accounting data (Maggina, 2010). Most of the 
research, in fact, covers inconsistencies and factors 
that cause informational gaps that are most 
apparent in small and medium sized Greek listed 
companies.  For example, Apostolou and 
Nanopoulos (2009) find that among Greek 
corporations there is a significant extent of non-
compliance in respect of IASs and the disclosures 
of Greek regulations. However, such research 
covers non-bank corporations.  
 
2.1 The Greek Banking Market. 
 
Gray (1988) indicates that capitalistic, advanced 
markets place a high degree of emphasis on 
independence, professionalism, transparency, 
flexibility and optimism, while socialist-oriented 
markets emphasize dependencies through statutory 
control, secrecy, uniformity and conservatism. 
Greece‟s institutional setting is usually depicted as 
a fragile institutional environment with the topical 
market considered having a meagre legal regime, 
enforcement and transparency rules (Ballas et al., 
1998).  
 
Additionally, various authors (Ballas, 1994; Ballas 
et al. 1998; Baralexis, 2004) suggest that Greek 
firms rely on private deals to obtain funding, 
which reduces the informativeness of accounting 
reports. Tzovas (2006) states that high levels of 
discretion associated with a poor institutional 
setting and low level of monitoring creates the 
conditions for earnings management to 
materialize. Greece‟s institutional setting directs to 
the suspicion that managers can employ higher 
levels of judgment in the methods of corporate 
image management. 
 
The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) got listed 
among the developed markets in 2001 (Artikis et 
al. 2008) and at the end of 2006, 317 companies 
were listed; however, as of March 2010 the Greek 
Stock Market has been retained by FTSE on the 
Watch List for possible demotion to Advanced 
Emerging status (FTSE, 2010); „The Greek 
authorities have, in recent years, introduced a 
regime of regulatory development. However, while 
many of these changes reflect progress in bringing 
the Greek market in line with other developed 
markets, international investors have noted that 
these reforms are not yet fully reflected in market 
practice...‟ (FTSE, p.1). Greece‟s complete 
incorporation into the EU buoyed the domestic 
investors to take on higher risk investments. There 
was a growth in the transaction volume and a 
dramatic rise in operating entities in the market 
complemented by a rise in the number of listed 
companies from 45 to 343. Since 2003 the ASE 
composite index was rising in a stable pace 
reaching a record high closing price of 5334.5 
points in October 2008 (see Figure 1 below). 
However, due to the economic crisis the index fell 
sharply (by 68%) and especially after 2009 never 
reached again a closing price beyond 1,700 points 
as at the time of writing.  
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Figure 1: Athens Stock Exchange Indices 
 
Source: Alpha Bank 2009 
 
 
The recent economic slowdown, rising provisions 
and increasing pressures of improving capital 
adequacy, resulted in strict lending standards and a 
near „stop‟ to the process of credit expansion 
(Deloitte, 2010). 
 
The quality of the loan portfolios is the primary 
concern as of now. The financial crisis together 
with the downgrading of the credit rating of 
Greece is likely to deteriorate the quality of loan 
portfolio. The total number of banks in the Greek 
region is 66 (Bank of Greece, 2010), and 15 out of 
those institutions were listed on the ASE (Hellenic 
Bank Association, 2010). 40% of the companies 
consisting the FTSE/Athex 20 are banks.  
More specifically their participation on the index 
reaches 56% as indicated in figure 2 (ASE, 2010). 
By observing the examined period of this research 
is obvious that the banking sector index 
outperformed ASE General Index during the 
period 2004 to 2007. International analysts gave 
favourable recommendations for most of Greek 
banks during this period (Deloitte, 2007).  
Figure 2 
 
 
Nevertheless, the extraordinary performance of the 
banking sector during the period 2004-2008 was 
reversed in the year 2009 following strong 
pressure on the Banking Index because of the 
economic turmoil; leading to a sharp deterioration 
in the “FTSE ATHEX Bank Index” starting from 
January 2008 (figure 3) (Deloitte, 2010). 
 
Figure 2: General and Banking Indices 2005 – 
2010 
 
Source: Naftemporiki, 2010 
 
Holding nearly three quarters of the total invested 
assets banks are among the leaders of ASE (Artikis 
et al., 2008); and Greece‟s simultaneous adoption 
and implementation of IAS and Basle II provides a 
unique opportunity to examine how the nation's 
structural terrain shapes the implementation of 
disclosure requirements. 
3. Methodology and Sample 
 
The analysis covers the disclosures of the financial 
statements of banks for the years ended 2005 and 
2008. Evans and Taylor (1982) recommend in 
depth examination of published financial 
statements to measure the degree of disclosure 
because it allows for a more comprehensive 
picture of the implementation process. There are 
various methods utilised in the way that 
researchers decide to approach the subject so far. 
Woods and Marginson (2004), Linsley et al. 
(2006), Woods et al. (2009), have utilised content 
analysis as the main tool of research.  Others, such 
as Reynolds‟ et al. (2008) support their 
methodologies on a survey-based analysis. Other 
research studies utilise cross-section models in 
which each type of a disclosure index is regressed 
on proxy-related variables in order to detect the 
existence of a statistically significant relationship 
(Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005; Mohan, 2006). 
Other researchers have made an attempt on 
researching all accessible measures of disclosure 
56%
44%
Banks
The rest
Source: ASE, 2010
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(e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beattie et al. 2004). 
Our study utilizes an approach similar Linsley‟s et 
al. (2006) and Wood‟s et al. (2009).  
 
One noticeable fact is that many papers fill out 
each other thus creating continuity. Linsley et al. 
(2006) utilizes nine pairs of UK and Canadian 
banks based on their assets, while Woods et al. 
(2009) uses the top 25 banks of the world in terms 
of market capitalization. Wood‟s et al. (2009) 
provides an interesting cross-country research 
example in that it examines the annual reports of 
25 banks in three different time intervals; “start 
(2000), mid (2003) and end (2006)” (p.11) trying 
to discover “changes in disclosure practices over 
time” (p.15); unlike Linsley‟s et al. (2006) paper 
where changes over time are not researched. In our 
case a combination of both is applied solely in the 
Greek region. The top 15 Greek banks are 
employed instead of bank pairs, where the banks 
are:  
(i) Paired with themselves in two different 
fiscal years (before IFRS and Basel II and after). 
(ii) Grouped into Big and Small for the same 
fiscal years 
 
Another very important factor that varies greatly 
among the literature is the size of the sample and 
the geographical or regional context of it. 
Reynolds (2008) utilizes the 100 top banks for her 
research in order to have a global view on the 
subject; Woods et al. (2008; 2009) also use a 
worldwide but much smaller sample of 25 banks. 
KPMG (2009), narrows down the regional 
framework and concentrates only on sixteen 
European banks whereas Woods and Marginson 
(2004) narrow it down even more on both terms 
(regional and sample size), concentrating only on 
nine FTSE100 UK banks. Linsley et al. (2006) 
choose to compare nine pairs of similar size UK 
and Canadian banks in order to trace the 
differences in the banking risk disclosures between 
the two markets and isolate differences that are 
country-specific. 
 
Textual analyses include thematic; meaning-
oriented content analysis where the whole text is 
analysed. By using content analysis, we 
decompose information on a sentence-by-sentence 
basis so as to achieve greater informative content; 
the coder used in order to code and classify risk-
related references is based not on words but fully 
articulate sentences, considered more reliable 
(Milne and Adler, 1999). This is in line with 
Hassan and Marston (2010) who claim that „in-
depth future research is needed to update these 
results because fast and continuous development 
in content analysis software and changes in the 
financial reporting environment have taken place 
since 1994‟ (p.4). 
No pairing of banks takes place, but instead the 
annual reports of the years 2008 and 2005 of the 
sample banks are compared and employed in order 
to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness of 
Basel II (Pillar 3), in the Greek banking industry. 
Employing those two years makes it possible to 
understand whether or not Basel II was successful 
in fostering market discipline by pressing banks to 
disclose more information regarding the credit and 
interest rate risks they face and making them more 
transparent. 
 
As with any research method, content analysis has 
an equal share of merits and demerits. While the 
advantages are that is a very transparent, non-
reactive and flexible method which can be applied 
to many different kinds of unstructured 
information it can also be used for both qualitative 
and quantitative studies and is a great method for 
creating comparative analysis between samples. 
Also, it offers the opportunity to statistically 
analyze text which is crucial for our study. Equally 
though, content analysis can only be as good as the 
documents on which the practitioner works. It is 
also considered to be subject to increased error. 
This is the reason why a computer-assisted content 
analysis approach (GATE software) through the 
use of a coder is implied; computerization of a 
content analysis assists in error minimization.  
 
3.1 Sample 
 
The annual reports of 15 listed Greek banks in the 
ASE serve as the sample for the study. According 
to the Bank of Greece (BoG, 2009), the total 
amount of banks in the Greek region is 66 banks 
including co-operative banks, Greek banks and 
branches of foreign credit institutions; hence, our 
sample represents approximately 23% of the 
banking institutions in Greece.  More specifically, 
the annual reports of the 15 sample banks for the 
years 2005 (before the implementation of Basel II 
in Greece) and 2008 (the first year of full 
implementation of Basel II in Greece) are 
collected from the filings that each institution 
preserves with the BoG
2
.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Some exceptions take place due to missing data. In the 
tests for market capitalization and book-to-market ratio 
for 2005, “TT Hellenic Postbank” and “Laiki Group” 
are excluded; they were not listed in the ASE at this 
point in time, meaning that their market capitalization 
and book-to-market could not be measured. 
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The sample is carefully structured in order to offer 
information before and after the implementation of 
Basel II for comparison purposes. During the 
design process of the sample, the choice between 
annual reports and quarterly reports had to be 
taken. Annual reports are chosen on comparability 
and relevance and reliability grounds mainly due 
to three reasons: (i) a considerable amount of both 
quantitative and qualitative information that is 
missing from the quarterly reports, (ii) a sizeable 
percentage of quarterly statements that are 
unaudited and (iii) not all sample banks offer 
quarterly reports of previous years
3
. The table 
above (Table I) provides and alphabetical list of 
the sample banks along with their year of listing, 
categorization of market capitalisation and total 
assets. 
 
Source: ASE, 2010 
 
                                                 
3 Marfin Egnatia bank was created after the merger of 
Egnatia bank with Marfin Financial Group in 2007. It is 
treated as being the same bank in both financial years 
examined. The same applies to Marfin Popular bank 
(former Laiki Group). Additionally, the annual reports 
of Marfin Egnatia bank and Marfin Popular bank are 
utilized for 2008; whereas for 2005 the annual reports of 
Egnatia bank and Laiki group are employed. 
 
3.2 Description of the Process – The Coding 
Grid 
 
The procedure followed is broken down in 4 stages 
with the aim of easing the degree of 
understandability to the reader. However, because 
there are no specific details presenting the way in 
which variables are taken under consideration 
during the design process, the coding grid which is 
employed in this research is redesigned from 
scratch. Figure 4 on the next page is a simple way 
to represent the method and idea on which the 
coding grid is built.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I. Sample of Banks in Alphabetical Order  
  
Foundation 
Year 
Year of 
Listing 
Index 
Participation 
Category 
 Total  
Assets* 
ATE Bank 1929 2001 FTSE/Athex 20 Big Cap €28.03bn 
Alpha Bank 1879 1925 FTSE/Athex 20 Big Cap €64.94bn 
Aspis Bank 1992 1998 FTSE/Athex 80 Med/Sm Cap €2.61bn  
Attica Bank 1925 1964 FTSE/Athex 80 Med/Sm Cap €4,50bn 
Bank of Cyprus 1989 1991 FTSE/Athex 20 Big Cap €36.11bn 
Bank of Greece 1928 1930 - Med/Sm Cap €70.92bn 
Piraeus Bank 1916 1918 FTSE/Athex 20 Big Cap €54.64bn 
Eurobank EFG 1990 1999 FTSE/Athex 20 Big Cap €81,96bn 
Emporiki Bank 1907 1909 FTSE/Athex 20 
Low Disp. & 
Sp. Feat. 
€29.76bn 
Geniki Bank 1937 1963 FTSE/Athex 80 Big Cap €4.92bn 
Marfin Egnatia 
Bank 
1936 1991 - 
Low Disp. & 
Sp. Feat. 
€19.32bn 
Marfin Popular 
Bank 
1901 2007 FTSE/Athex 20 Big Cap €38.35bn 
National Bank of 
Greece 
1841 1905 FTSE/Athex 20 Big Cap €101.06bn 
Proton Bank 2001 2005 FTSE/Athex 140 Big Cap €1.96bn 
TT Hellenic 
Postbank 
2002 2006 FTSE/Athex 20 Big Cap €14.70bn 
* For the year 2008         
Big Cap = Big Capitalization 
    Med/Sm Cap = Medium and Small Capitalization 
   Low Disp. & Sp. Feat = Low Dispersion and Special Features 
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The first step of the design process separates 
credit from interest rate risk. In each category 
only disclosures pointing directly on one of the 
two types of risk are included. More specifically, 
phrases like “negative economic and financial 
environment” are not included even if credit and 
interest rate risk are implied by the term financial. 
 
In the second stage the separation of quantitative 
from qualitative disclosures takes place; for 
example, qualitative disclosures which reference 
or point out some quantitative   data are included 
in the quantitative category
4
. It should be noted 
that the distinction among the two groups is on 
the new disclosure pools created on the first 
stage. Thirdly, after the first grouping of the 
disclosures the criteria under which the 
information is categorized into good/bad/neutral 
news are decided. In the good news category 
phrases with a positive meaning (i.e. „decrease of 
credit risk‟ or „increased provisions against credit 
risk‟) and positive management related phrases as 
well are contained. On the other hand, the 
opposite meanings go under the bad news 
category. The „neutral‟ category contains phrases 
regarding the systems and policies that banks use 
or risk-related information which do fit neither the 
good nor the bad news categories.  
 
The final and most challenging part contains the 
decision over which criteria the distinction of tense 
should be made.  Since annual reports, essentially, 
represent a point in time, the decision not to use 
present tense is obvious. Additionally, under the 
past category, we include phrases referring to the 
past or even quantitative information such the 
quantity of provisions which have already been 
taken by the firm. On the other hand, under the 
future group - besides information or prediction 
                                                 
4 Table titles were also included in the quantitative 
category 
regarding the future - also fall general policies of 
the bank which were and will continue to be active 
in the future. Only in cases where is specified that 
a policy was initiated in the past year, exceptions 
are taken and go under the past type. Based on the 
above, 12 different coding classifications are 
created and shown in Table II below. In the 
definitions set, all phrases that specifically define 
each of the two types of risks are decided to be 
included.  
 
 
A descriptive analysis of the coding results takes 
place before the statistical tests. The main 
statistical tests utilized in this study are non-
parametric; Wilcoxon‟s two-tailed test and 
Spearman‟s correlation coefficient. All 
hypothesized relationships are tested at a 5% level 
of significance. 
 
Two measures have been selected to represent the 
size of each institution, total assets and market 
capitalization. There are many other ways to 
measure and represent size like employee numbers 
or turnover; however there is no evidence to favor 
one over another (Hackson and Milne, 1996). For 
measuring relative profitability, two options were 
examined: the Return on Equity (ROE) and the 
Return on Assets (ROA), which is finally chosen 
due to its greater stability throughout various 
Table II. Disclosure Coding Grid  
  
Credit 
Risk 
Interest 
Rate Risk 
Total 
Text disclosures sentence 
characteristics   1 2 
 Quantitative/good 
news/future A 
  
  
Quantitative/bad 
news/future B 
   Quantitative/neutral 
news/future C 
   Qualitative/good 
news/future D 
   Qualitative/bad 
news/future E 
   Qualitative/neutral 
news/future F 
   Quantitative/good 
news/past G 
   Quantitative/bad news/past H 
   Quantitative/neutral 
news/past I 
   Qualitative/good news/past J 
   Qualitative/bad news/past K 
   Qualitative/neutral 
news/past L 
   Definitions M     
 Total 
   
  
Risk 
Disclosures
Credit Risk
/Interest Rate
Quantitative / 
Qualitative
Good/Bad
/Neutral
Future/Past
Figure 3:  Schematic of the Coding Design 
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capital structures. In order to measure the risk 
profile of the banks, book-to-market ratio is 
employed. This ratio is chosen based upon the 
Fama and French (1992) study and Linsley‟s et al. 
(2006) choice of the same ratio for the same 
purpose. The section that follows provides a 
descriptive analysis of the preliminary findings. 
4. Descriptive Analysis of Findings  
 
Throughout the coding process, a total of 907 risk
5
 
sentences were identified in the sample of annual 
reports. From table III below, the category with the 
highest frequency of appearance is F – “qualitative 
/ neutral news / future” (371 disclosures in total).  
 
 
The disclosures of category F mostly consist of 
clarifications and explanations of general risk 
management policy. Another point that highlights 
the preference towards such type of disclosures is 
the consistency of the results for both years. In the 
annual report of Alpha bank (2009) is stated „The 
early detection of credit risk and the adoption of 
measures to address it are a key priority for Alpha 
Bank as well as distinct competitive advantage‟ 
(p.13). In the same report is also highlighted that 
„Central to the measurement of credit risk are 
credit rating systems‟ (Alpha Bank, 2009, p.60). 
Statements and admissions of this type aim at 
restoring confidence in market participants that  
                                                 
5 Credit risk and Interest Rate risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
banks are equipped with adequate risk monitoring 
systems. However, such kinds of disclosures do 
not provide any sort of specific actions or results 
regarding the management of the risk. It is likely 
that disclosures of such kind are favoured because 
while on the one hand they provide assurances to 
the user, on the other, they are not bound to any 
future promises. Promises that can prove costly, 
especially when the market monitoring 
mechanisms- which banks try to avoid due to fear 
of judgment – are highly capable of extending 
discipline when market players are caught out in 
isolation especially in a downturn. Another 
striking fact that emerges out of the results (table 
III) is the zero sum of category A – „quantitative/ 
good news / future‟ as well as the nearly-zero 
Table III. Number of risk sentence disclosures for the sample of banks 
    2008 2005 
Total 
  
Credit 
Risk 
Interest 
Rate 
Risk Total 
Credit 
Risk 
Interest 
Rate 
Risk Total 
Text disclosures sentence 
characteristics 
  
1 2 1 2 
Quantitative/good news/future A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Quantitative/bad news/future B 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Quantitative/neutral news/future C 13 0 13 4 0 4 17 
Qualitative/good news/future D 31 3 34 12 2 14 48 
Qualitative/bad news/future E 5 0 5 3 0 3 8 
Qualitative/neutral news/future F 164 62 226 115 30 145 371 
Quantitative/good news/past G 6 0 6 1 0 1 7 
Quantitative/bad news/past H 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 
Quantitative/neutral news/past I 67 18 85 8 10 18 103 
Qualitative/good news/past J 9 0 9 4 1 5 14 
Qualitative/bad news/past K 6 0 6 5 0 5 11 
Qualitative/neutral news/past L 137 39 176 74 25 99 275 
Definitions M 18 13 31 13 6 19 50 
     
  
  
  
Total   457 135 592 241 74 315 907 
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disclosures made regarding „quantitative/bad 
news/future‟. While it may indeed be difficult to 
quantify in detail future predictions banks may 
also avoid disclosing quantified future predictions 
for reasons exposed above. Categories I and K, 
contain neutral quantitative/qualitative information 
referring to past. Such results may also attest to the 
fact that banks also may try to avoid direct 
comparisons with past disclosures and past 
performance.  
 
It can be implied that the disclosures made are 
based on scepticism and reservation. Greek banks 
seem to be reserved in disclosing more than what 
is deemed as the minimum information set 
necessary to alleviate fears on the one hand and 
avoid comparisons that could potentially extend to 
market discipline on the other. It also becomes 
clear from table IV below that, in general, Greek 
banks tend to disclose more qualitative 
information rather than quantitative. 
 
While the Basel II framework aims at encouraging 
banks to improve their internal information 
systems and to distribute both qualitative and 
quantitative information in their annual financial 
reports, the results of table IV present an unequal 
distribution of disclosures. More specifically, the 
qualitative disclosures amount to 84.8 per cent 
whereas the corresponding quantitative proportion 
is only 15.2 per cent, indicating a big gap between 
them. The same pattern exists for both years 
examined, leading to the conclusion that on this 
aspect no improvement is achieved by the 
implementation of Basel II. Furthermore, adding 
to the above reasons regarding that trend is that, if 
the sizes of risks are disclosed then the reader 
would probably have a better perspective of 
reality.  
 
It is quite possible that banks prefer qualitative 
information disclosure owing to the degree of ease 
for promoting their own perspective on the matter, 
but also because such type of information is not 
easily qualified; hence leaving an interpretation 
(subjective) to the reader. Moreover, it has been 
very well documented, that the proprietary costs 
for quantified risk information are higher due to 
the high sensitivity of quantified information 
(Garten, 1995; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000; 
CEBS, 2008; Acharya et al., 2010; Asongu, 2010). 
 
The proportion of quantitative/future disclosures in 
this research barely reaches 2 per cent
6
 of the total 
and is mostly consisted of neutral references. This 
also indicates the reluctance of banks to disclose 
sensitive information. Due to quantitative risk 
information possessing greater value to qualitative, 
                                                 
6 1.99% 
this rule also applies to past and future disclosures. 
Future information is considered to have greater 
value compared to past and the reasoning for that 
follows the classic finance theory according to 
which, investors base their actions on future 
predictions. The results of the analysis are 
approximately 48 per cent past disclosures and 52 
per cent future (table IV). Once more, within past 
and future disclosures, the neutrally pre-disposed 
disclosures account for approximately 90% of the 
risks disclosed; this also represents the biggest 
proportion of the future references and again 
mostly consists of general policy disclosures. 
Hence, the results indicate that future disclosures 
in reality are less than past ones.  
 
More specifically, the disclosures examined were 
characterised by:  
(i) diversity on exposures disclosed  
(ii) diversity of statements regarding the 
impact of the crisis;  
(iii) generalism on the valuation of 
exposures affected by the market 
turmoil and their accounting; and  
(iv) variety regarding the presentations of 
disclosures.  
 
What is also interesting is the fact that, in 2005, 
future disclosures were greater than the 
corresponding 2008 future disclosures on 
percentage terms; while also in 2005, past 
disclosures were also less compared to 2008 past 
disclosures. On the other hand, in 2008 the volume 
of past disclosures was marginally greater than 
future disclosures. The above results are an 
indication that Greek banks have reverted to 
defensive tactics.  Having in mind the financial 
environment of the country and the credit-based 
system in which banks operate, it is safe to 
conclude – according to the expectations theory - 
that banks tend to disclose more future information 
when expecting good years ahead and less when 
they expect a worsening of the financial 
environment and by extension a worsening of a 
bank‟s status.  
 
The split among “good news / bad news / neutral 
news” disclosures favours once more the latter 
category. Neutral news is approximately 89 per 
cent, with good news reaching 8 per cent and bad 
news of approximately 3 per cent (table IV below). 
In both years examined, the gap between neutral 
disclosures and the other two categories is large; in 
both cases neutral news are preferred by directors 
because they indirectly promote confidence and 
reassurance without violating guarantees. 
However, in 2008 the proportion of bad news was 
less than in 2005.  
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With regards to the good news proportion, the 
situation is reversed; it was lower in 2005 than in 
2008. Taking into account the differing financial 
conditions in such years, banks were less hesitant 
in disclosing bad news in their annual reports due 
to the flourishing economic environment through a 
state of euphoria and confidence to investors; 
embedded is the belief that the markets are capable 
of „absorbing‟ bad news. On the other hand, in a 
downturn, such as in year 2008, banks were 
slightly more „sanguine‟ in disclosing good news 
and avoid bad news in order to reassure investors 
of the bank‟s financial status; embedded is the 
belief that markets tend to be less forgiving during 
such times.  
 
It was expected that the quantity of credit risk 
disclosures would be much bigger compared to 
interest rate risk disclosures. Credit risk 
disclosures are in total more than triple to interest 
rate risk ones. Disclosures for both categories of 
risk show great growth, in 2005 the total amount 
was 315 whereas in 2008 they reached 592, 
leading to a growth of approximately 88 per cent
7
. 
Credit risk disclosures grew, from 2005 to 2008, 
by almost 90 per cent
8
 while at the same time 
interest rate risk disclosures grew by 82 per cent
9
. 
The results in the section above provide an initial 
indication showing that, in total, due to the 
implementation of Basel II accord Greek banks 
tend to indeed disclose more risk related 
information in their annual reports. It is not clear 
though, that such information is indeed materially 
useful. It is also not clear whether the quantity and  
                                                 
7 87.94% 
8 89.63% 
9 82.43% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
quality of information disclosed is owed to bank-
specific indicators such as size and profitability or 
whether it is owed to market-wide factors and the 
collective regional structural domain. This is the 
aim of the section that follows. 
 
4.1 Hypotheses Testing 
 
The Basel Committees‟ target regarding risk 
disclosure, in Basel II, was to push banks towards 
more risk information disclosure in their annual 
reports; it is rational to posit that the 2008 annual 
reports will disclose more risk related information 
compared to those in 2005. Therefore the first set 
of hypotheses tests whether the implementation of 
Basel II resulted in making Greek banks disclose 
more risk related information. 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: Banks in year 2008 will disclose a 
greater amount of risk-related information than in 
the year 2005. 
Hypothesis 1.2: Banks in year 2008 will disclose a 
larger amount of credit risk information than in the 
year 2005. 
Hypothesis 1.3: Banks in year 2008 will disclose a 
larger amount of interest rate risk information than 
in the year 2005. 
 
The non-parametric Wilcoxon test has been 
applied in order to test the above hypotheses in 
order to investigate whether the banks‟ annual 
reports in year 2008 disclose significantly different 
quantities of total risk, credit risk and interest rate 
risk compared to the year 2005. The test proved 
that at the 5 per cent level of significance, total 
risk
10
 disclosures are significantly different 
                                                 
10 Credit risk and Interest Rate risk 
Table IV. Summary of characteristics of risk disclosures (excluding definitions) 
 
Characteris
tic 
Total 
Number of 
disclosures 
Proportion 
(%) 
2008  
Total 
Number of 
Disclosure
s 
Proportion 
(%) 
2005 
Total 
Number of 
Disclosure
s 
Proportion 
(%) 
Quantitative 
disclosures 
130 15.2 105 18.7 25 8.5 
Qualitative 
disclosures 
727 84.8 456 81.3 271 91.5 
 
      
Past 
disclosures 
412 48.1 283 50.5 129 43.6 
Future 
disclosures 
445 51.9 278 49.5 167 56.4 
 
      
Good news 
disclosures 
69 8.1 49 8.7 20 6.8 
Bad news 
disclosures 
22 2.6 12 2.1 10 3.4 
Neutral 
disclosures 
766 89.3 500 89.2 266 89.8 
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between 2005 and 2008 (table V below). It is after 
the implementation of Basel II where an increase 
in risk disclosures is observed (p = 0.012). After 
testing hypotheses 1.2 and 1.3 a paradox arises. 
Interest rate risk disclosures are significantly 
greater (p = 0.011) but credit risk disclosures are 
not. Although the actual amount of credit risk 
disclosures is greater in 2008 (table III), this 
change is not statistically significant. It should also 
be noted that 13 out of 15 banks had a greater 
amount of credit risk disclosures in 2008 than in 
2005. Nevertheless, this result raises issues 
regarding the effectiveness of Basel II. The 
question that rises at this point is if the accord 
managed to have a crucial impact on important 
areas of banking in Greece or just on issues of 
lower significance for the industry
11
; or if the 
country‟s regulatory system selectively chooses 
which aspects of international regulation to 
harmonise and which not. 
 
 
Further tests have been conducted; paired 
comparisons for the years 2005 and 2008, of Total 
Assets, Market Capitalization, ROA, and Book to 
Market ratio in order to check whether those 
variables increased over time. The results showed 
that, banks in 2008 had significantly greater total 
assets (p = 0.001), lower market capitalization 
(p=0.002), and higher book to market ratios (p = 
0.001) compared to the year 2005. Their returns on 
assets however, did not change significantly. An 
important fact is that 9 out of 15 banks present a 
decrease in their ROA for the fiscal year 2008 
compared to 2005. Such a result has occurred due 
to the crisis in 2008 that pushed banks to increase 
their provisions against risks thus resulting in 
reduced returns. 
 
Prior studies on the field of disclosure, (i.e. Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999), have discovered a positive 
association between company size and disclosure. 
Linsley et al. (2006) have also found that there is a 
positive association between company size and 
risk disclosure levels in the annual reports of 
                                                 
11 The „lower‟ significance implied here for interest rate 
risk relates to such type of risks being isolated and 
managed separately  
Canadian and UK banks. We also test for this 
association in the Greek banking sector. The 
hypotheses to be tested are: 
 
Hypothesis 2.1: A positive association exists 
between the size of a bank and the total amount of 
risk disclosures. 
Hypothesis 2.2: A positive association exists 
between the size of a bank and the total amount of 
credit risk disclosures. 
Hypothesis 2.3: A positive association exists 
between the size of a bank and the total amount of 
interest rate risk disclosures. 
 
In order to test the above hypotheses (i.e. the 
association level among the number of risk 
disclosures and the variables of size and 
profitability), Spearman‟s rho is calculated at a 5 
per cent level of significance. Table VI that 
follows provides for a preliminary summary of 
risk disclosures identified for the sample of banks. 
Tables VII and VIII following immediately 
provide the results of the tests. 
Table V. Significance level for comparisons 
between 2005 and 2008 (Wilcoxon test) 
Parameter P-value* 
Total risk 0.012 
Credit risk 0.113 
Interest rate risk 0.011 
Total assets 0.001 
Market capitalization 0.002 
Return on assets 0.363 
Book to market ratio 0.001 
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Table VIII. Spearman Correlation test results for 
Market Cap. - Disclosures 
Market capitalization 2005 2008 
Credit 
Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
-0.036 -0.082 
p-value 0.907 0.771 
N 13 * 15 
Interest 
Rate Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
0.196 -0.122 
p-value 0.521 0.664 
N 13 * 15 
Total Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
0.099 -0.147 
p-value 0.747 0.602 
N 13 * 15 
* The banks “TT Hellenic Postbank” and “Marfin 
Popular Bank” are not included in the analysis 
 
It can be seen from tables VII and VIII to the left, 
that the two variables
12
 chosen to represent the size 
of the institutions do not correlate with the amount 
of risk disclosures. No significant correlation is 
observed between either credit risk, interest rate 
risk or/and their total with total assets and market 
capitalization for either years (2005 and 2008). 
This result goes against earlier studies (for 
example, Botossan, 1997; Ahmed and Courtis, 
1999; Street and Bryant, 2000; Camfferman and 
Cook, 2002; Naser et al. 2002; Ali, Ahmed, & 
Henry, 2004; Al Saeed, 2006; Hassan, et al. 2006; 
and Mangena et al. 2007) which support that a 
size-disclosure relationship does exist. 
Furthermore, Woods et al. (2009) also discovered 
in their research that there is no association among 
the bank size and the quantity of disclosures. The 
results show that there is no quasi-norm related to 
size, which Greek banks follow, by which bigger 
institutions should disclose more information. 
Arriving at the link between profitability and 
disclosure, this has been investigated in the past by 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) but the results were not 
adequate to prove such an association. Linsley et 
al. (2006) discovered that there is no association 
connecting profitability and quantity of bank risk 
disclosures. The same research points out that it is 
logical to conclude that profitability results from 
good risk management thus the more profitable the 
bank the more pleased to disclose more 
information regarding its risks and risk 
management.  
 
This theory is examined based on the hypotheses 
below: 
 
                                                 
12 Total Assets and Market Capitalization 
Table VI. Summary of disclosures for individual banks 
 
Banks 
2008 2005 
Total risk 
disclosures 
Credit 
Risk 
Interest 
Rate 
Risk 
Total risk 
disclosures 
Credit 
Risk 
Interest 
Rate 
Risk 
ATE bank 7 5 2 11 9 2 
Alpha bank 42 37 5 8 6 2 
Aspis bank 8 8 0 3 3 0 
Attica bank 67 42 25 25 16 9 
Bank of Cyprus 55 48 7 37 26 11 
Bank of Greece 11 11 0 69 65 4 
Piraeus bank 29 24 5 8 7 1 
EFG Eurobank 47 38 9 36 28 8 
Emporiki bank 15 15 0 11 7 4 
Geniki bank 42 28 14 4 3 1 
Marfin Egnatia bank 86 61 25 14 11 3 
Marfin Popular bank 60 41 19 25 16 9 
National Bank of Greece 26 18 8 15 8 7 
Proton bank 56 47 9 34 29 5 
TT Hellenic Postbank 41 34 7 15 7 8 
Total 592 457 135 315 241 74 
Table VII. Spearman Correlation test results for 
Total Assets - Disclosures  
Total Assets 2005 2008 
Credit 
Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
0.102 -0.164 
p-value 0.717 0.558 
N 15 15 
Interest 
Rate 
Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
0.104 -0.192 
p-value 0.712 0.492 
N 15 15 
Total 
Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
0.197 -0.189 
p-value 0.481 0.499 
N 15 15 
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Hypothesis 3.1: A positive association exists 
between the relative profitability of a bank and the 
total amount of risk disclosures. 
Hypothesis 3.2: A positive association exists 
between the relative profitability of a bank and the 
total amount of credit risk disclosures. 
Hypothesis 3.3: A positive association exists 
between the relative profitability of a bank and the 
total amount of interest rate risk disclosures. 
 
According to the results of Spearman‟s test (table 
IX below) there is no significant association 
between profitability and the quantity disclosures 
of either credit risk, interest rate risk or their total 
for any of the examined years.  The most 
profitable firms can potentially be reluctant to 
disclose much of their risk related information 
which is considered to be proprietary in fear that 
their competitors will try to copy them to their 
advantage. For example, information regarding a 
new service improvement or innovation divulged 
by one bank may also be used to the gain of its 
rivals. This has also been documented through 
Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Darrough and 
Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990. In addition, 
included in the costs of disclosure are the costs of 
assembly and distribution; the costs of 
accountants; the costs of the audits. Lawsuit costs 
may also be invited if a bank is prosecuted owing 
to its disclosure if the information provided turns 
out to be invalid. It follows that an internal 
decision to provide more (than the minimum 
necessary) information to the public can be based 
on a cost-benefit analysis. This has also been 
documented in Skinner, 1994; Healy and Palepu, 
1993; and Botosan, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
Past studies examining a possible association of 
the risk profile of a bank and the amount of risk 
disclosures, discovered that no such connection 
exists (Linsley et al, 2006). However, there is no 
previous research regarding such an association in 
the Greek region. The rationale that such a 
relationship might exists lies on the fact that the 
more risky a bank is, the more incentive might 
have to disclose risk related information in order to 
reassure the market regarding the safety of its 
business. The hypotheses to be tested are: 
 
Hypothesis 4.1: A positive association exists 
between levels of risk of Greek banks and the total 
amount of risk disclosures. 
Hypothesis 4.2: A positive association exists 
between levels of risk of the Greek banks and the 
total amount of credit risk disclosures. 
Hypothesis 4.3: A positive association exists 
between levels of risk of the Greek banks and the 
total amount of interest rate risk disclosures. 
 
 
Table X on the next page also reveals that no 
significant correlation exists between the 
disclosure amounts of credit risk, interest rate risk 
or their total with the book-to-market ratio which 
is chosen to represent the risk profile of each bank. 
Riskier banks do not try to offer more information 
to the marketplace in order to reassure the 
participants that their risk is manageable and under 
control by the risk management division. It is quite 
possible that riskier banks try to keep a low profile 
by avoiding a display of much risk related 
information to the market participants. 
 
This may also be referred to as „disclosure 
position‟ first quoted by Gibbins et al. (1990) 
whereby depending on whether management plays 
an active or passive role in controlling information 
a dual dimension of disclosure emerges: ritualism 
and opportunism. The former relates to blind 
devotion to predefined disclosure standards while 
the later relates to the propensity of directors to 
hunt for company explicit benefits in the 
disclosure (or non-disclosure) of financial 
information. Psychology theory may also explain 
the use of „suitable‟ ascriptions or identity-directed 
propensities which are based on the motivational 
rationalization for this type of organizational 
behaviour. The results are also in line with prior 
research supporting the retrospective rationality 
and esteem-defensive behaviour, detected 
especially in circumstances of adverse economic 
conditions (see for example, Bettman & Weitz, 
1983; Staw, 1980). 
Table IX. Spearman Correlation test results for 
Return on Assets - Disclosures 
Return on assets 2005 2008 
Credit 
Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
0.106 0.136 
p-value 0.707 0.63 
N 15 15 
Interest 
Rate 
Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
-0.082 0.117 
p-value 0.772 0.678 
N 15 15 
Total 
Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
0.035 0.121 
p-value 0.901 0.666 
N 15 15 
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Linsley et al. (2006) discovered that a positive 
association, between the quantity of risk 
disclosures and definitions related to risk, exists in 
the annual reports of Canadian and UK banks. 
However, this rationale is based on inter-cultural 
discrepancies. There is no prior evidence regarding 
such a relation in the annual reports of Greek 
banks; the existence of such a relationship is also 
examined. According to such research, banks that 
provide greater amount of risk disclosures have the 
incentive to provide more definitions as well, in 
order to avoid misunderstandings by the readers. T 
hus, the more risk disclosures an annual report 
contains the bigger the possibility for 
misunderstandings or misinterpretations. The 
hypothesis to be tested is: 
 
Hypothesis 5.1: A positive association exists 
between the quantity of risk definitions disclosed 
and the total quantity of risk disclosures. 
 
The test showed a significant relationship between 
the number of definition disclosures and the 
number total risk
13
 disclosures (definitions 
excluded). As presented in table XI a significant 
positive relationship is observed for both years 
2005 and 2008 (p=0.018 and p=0.008 
respectively).  
Clatworthy and Jones (2003) assert that such 
behaviour can be attributed to informational 
explanations. Banks with a greater amount of risk 
disclosures also chose to disclose more risk 
definitions. Accounting narratives are difficult or 
very difficult to read for the less experienced 
reader and such a result might spring from the fact 
that much of the information provided to the 
reader is highly technical and prone to 
                                                 
13 Credit risk and Interest Rate risk 
misinterpretations which bank directors wish to be 
avoided. It is possible that banks voluntarily 
disclosing more content-related, „qualitative‟ risk 
information act in such a way either based on 
bounded rationality grounds or on attributional 
principles of discounting and augmentation. 
Hence, it can be implied that they also disclose 
more definitions to „make it easier‟ for the reader 
and guide him towards the correct (intended) 
meaning. These results are also consistent with 
prior research in the area (see Aerts, 2001;Bettman 
& Weitz, 1983; Tsang, 2002). 
 
5. Conclusions and Discussion 
This study contributes to the literature by 
providing results produced in a different 
institutional setting. This is based on Aerts‟ (2005) 
suggestions that the disclosure and explanation 
patterns displayed by companies from different 
countries are subject to cultural influences. The 
findings of the research show that, indeed, the 
amount of disclosures is statistically greater after 
Basel II. But, is the implementation the real cause 
of this increase? The Greek banking sector and the 
economy as a whole, after 2003 and until the first 
half of 2008 was experiencing great growth in 
terms of GDP and growth ratios. This great growth 
from 2005 to 2008 is reflected on the significantly 
greater total assets and higher book-to-market 
ratios of Greek banks. The theoretical as well as 
the empirical case for transparency as an enhancer 
of banking system robustness is not without 
controversy. It is likely that the risk disclosure 
policies and techniques just followed the general 
trend of the time and as they got modernized, they 
resulted in increased quantity.  
 
However, even if that is the case, it seems that still 
Basel II set the new standards and affected most of 
the EU in terms of banking regulation and 
supervision. Therefore, the most probable scenario 
is that indeed Basel II, one way or another, 
managed to increase risk disclosure in the Greek 
banking sector.  
 
Table X. Spearman Correlation test results for Book-
to-Market - Disclosures 
Book-to-market ratio 2005 2008 
Credit Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
0.213 0.231 
p-value 0.485 0.408 
N 13 * 15 
Interest Rate Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
-
0.145 
0.215 
p-value 0.629 0.441 
N 13 * 15 
Total Risk 
Spearman 
Correlation 
0.13 0.259 
p-value 0.672 0.35 
N 13 * 15 
* The banks “TT Hellenic Postbank” and “Marfin Popular 
Bank” are not included in the analysis 
Table XI. Spearman Correlation test results 
for Definitions - Disclosures 
Total Risk Disclosures 
(excluding definitions) 
2005 2008 
Definitions 
Spearman 
Correlation 
0.601 0.658 
p-value 0.018 0.008 
N 15 15 
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Disclosure, as a variable on its own, is judged to 
be latent; therefore, it can be indirectly observed 
through the values of a pragmatic variable. The 
coding pool was proven to be mostly crowded by 
general statements of risk management policy and 
methods which banks employ, rather than more 
specific and useful information to the reader. 
Another observation, regarding the coding results, 
is that very little quantitative risk information is 
disclosed and most of the disclosures incorporate 
past information
14
. 
 
It seems like Greece and its banking system has 
not yet reached the higher standards of the most 
developed countries on the field of disclosure, 
such as the UK. In addition, the fact that the Greek 
financial crisis is mostly a result of bad 
management and corruption indicates the 
possibility of loose supervision in the Greek 
banking sector. Larger banks, potentially through 
their size and positioning apply market pressure to 
smaller competitors resulting in low quantity of 
disclosures and transparency issues in the industry; 
in the words of Bliss and Flannery (2002) lack of 
discipline in the presence of market monitoring is 
likely due to agency problems between bank 
management and market members and is 
additionally aggravated by limited regulation and 
supervision. Greece and more specifically the 
Greek public sector for many years now have been 
listed among the most corrupt of the EU
15
. This 
problem is probably much deeper and should be 
approached sociologically also since it has its roots 
in the culture and modern history of Greece. An 
investigation on the issue of bad management, 
corruption and transparency would be very 
interesting and enlightening regarding the impact 
and causes of the Greek financial crisis. 
 
Five sets of hypotheses have been established and 
tested, three of which were not proven to apply. 
Furthermore, the rejected hypotheses put forward 
that there is no existing statistically significant 
correlation between the level of credit risk, interest 
rate risk or their sum and bank size, profitability or 
the risk profile of the firm. On the other hand, it is 
statistically proven that a positive association 
among the total amount of disclosures and the 
quantity of disclosed definitions exist. It has also 
been confirmed that the total risk and interest rate 
risk disclosures were statistically greater in 2008 
compared to 2005.  
 
                                                 
14 In absolute numbers future information is greater but 
as noted above in reality past information is greater 
because a big part of the future category consists of 
general statements 
15 Greece is ranked 71st in the CPI index 2009 
(Transparency International, 2010),  classifying it as the 
most corrupt in the EU  
Another thing that draws direct attention is the 
non-existing relationship between the size of an 
institution and the amount of risk disclosures. 
These results cannot be characterised as fully 
conclusive or final due to the different parameters 
and variables taken in each research. This study 
took place in the Greek region whereas other 
research has concentrated in fully developed 
financial markets such as the U.S, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the UK region. Nevertheless, it sheds 
some light in the disclosure domain by asserting 
that it is highly possible that different regions – 
and hence cultural factors therein - do not share 
the same attitude towards risk disclosure and 
transparency.  
 
A further observation is that no quasi-norm 
relationship exists (or even existed before the 
implementation of Basel II) in the way Greek 
banks disclose their risk-related information. Such 
quasi-norms might have existed or currently exist 
in other regions but as highlighted above, it is also 
quite possible that Basel II eliminated them by 
creating a framework under which all institutions 
are treated equally and is not up to them to decide 
whether or not to disclose more; hence, a level-
playing field for easily comparative disclosures 
among the institutions is created. Further research 
in this area, in the meta-Basel and meta-IFRS era, 
can shed further light as to whether Basle has 
indeed gradually achieved the intended outcomes. 
Furthermore, another explanation regarding the 
non-existence of quasi-norms might be proprietary 
costs and market discipline considerations. Bigger, 
more profitable or riskier banks do not disclose 
more than the minimum necessary – especially in 
turbulent times – providing an „example‟ to 
smaller, less profitable or less risky banks to 
follow the same strategy, thus through herding 
behaviour a vicious cycle is recreated. 
 
This study also discovers that a positive 
correlation between the quantity of definitions and 
the total amount of risk related disclosures exists. 
Banks that disclose more risk information in the 
annual reports seem more eager to disclose more 
definitions as well, in order to avoid 
misinterpretations of such disclosures. However, 
this could also be a coincidence; for example, as 
Woods et al. (2009) discovered, size and quantity 
of disclosures do not correlate; but the lengthier 
the report the more disclosures it contains. 
Following the same line of thinking definitions 
might just be growing in number simply because 
disclosures become greater. Further research is 
also needed in order to reach a solid conclusion. 
Many inadequacies still need to be addressed, 
which is obvious by the general non- transparent 
Greek financial sector environment. Certain 
problematic areas highlighted through this 
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research are in need of attention; firstly, the lack of 
quantitative information needs to be reversed and 
more quantitative information to be disclosed; 
secondly, since future information is more 
valuable to investors compared to past data, the 
amount of future risk information should also be 
raised; thirdly, another important issue that also 
needs to be addressed is whether the quarterly 
reports should also be regulated to the extent of 
being able to grasp the continuous changing nature 
of risks.  
 
It is also necessary to highlight some limitations 
that this research has faced. Not the whole 
spectrum of risks was researched. The variables 
chosen to represent size, profitability and risk 
profile might also not be necessarily the desired 
optimum. Such limitations indeed require further 
research on the field. There is also a requirement 
to research the variables that influence the extent 
of disclosure contained by culture. Variables in 
developed markets vary to those in developing 
(advanced-emerging) markets. Research also calls 
for a greater consideration given to accounting as 
it is exercised among diverse markets; as this 
paper and other preceding studies have revealed 
there are important disparities in accounting 
disclosures among national markets. This study 
focuses on listed banks in the Athens Stock 
Exchange and financial services research is limited 
with the Greek domain; the research on variables 
that shape the extent of disclosure in the Greek 
banking market is still at an infancy level. Further 
research must endeavour not only at increasing the 
sample of financial institutions being investigated 
but also researching them across time. Hence, a 
final limitation of this study is the relatively 
limited sample and time dimensions, which may 
possibly impinge on the overall generalisabilty of 
the obtained findings. 
 
Despite the existence of contradictory analyses - 
past and contemporary - there is a widespread 
consent that transparency while not a complete 
antidote against systemic volatility in financial 
systems internationally holds a considerable role 
in fostering financial stability. 
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